Survivability of Noneconomic Damages for Tortious Death in Washington by Andrews, Steve
COMMENTS
Survivability of Noneconomic Damages for
Tortious Death in Washington
Steve Andrews*
INTRODUCTION
Washington's wrongful death and survival statutes have tradition-
ally been difficult to fully understand. Fortunately, there has been an
equally long tradition of writers willing to attempt to "crack the code"
of survival and wrongful death actions.' Tortious death is compensat-
ed under the wrongful death and survival statutes. In general, a
wrongful death statute provides a cause of action for the decedent's
surviving family for losses they sustain as a result of the decedent's
death. In contrast, the survival statutes preserve the decedent's own
cause of action for personal injury and death, permitting the action to
be brought on behalf of the statutory beneficiaries and/or the
decedent's estate.2
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1. See, e.g., Bryant Brady, The Action for Wrongful Death in Washington, 4 WASH. L. REV.
61 (1929); J. Gregory Casey, Comment, Washington Wrongful Death and Survival Actions, 6
GONZ. L. REV. 314 (1971); Michael M. Martin, Measuring Damages in Survival Actions for
Tortious Death, 47 WASH. L. REV. 609 (1972).
2. The general wrongful death statute, codified at title 4, chapter 20, section 010, of the
Washington Revised Code, entitled "Wrongful Death-Right of Action" provides:
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another
his personal representative may maintain an action for damages against the person
causing the death; and although the death shall have been caused under such
circumstances as amount, in law, to a felony.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.010 (1996).
The legislature, by enacting title 4, chapter 20, section 020, of the Washington Revised
Code, determined that only certain persons may maintain a wrongful death action. That statute,
entitled "Wrongful Death-Beneficiaries of Action" provides:
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The focus of this Comment will be the 1993 amendment to
Washington's general survival statute.3 In particular, the goal is to
interpret how noneconomic damages for tortious death are to be treated
under the new survival statute and to answer the question of what
noneconomic damages are available to the victim's survivors.
Washington's statutory scheme is complex, with five potentially
applicable statutes, including three wrongful death statutes and two
survival statutes.4  Because of this complexity, each statute will be
examined for available noneconomic damages, the survivability of these
damages, the beneficiaries of the action, and possible duplication of
damages. In answering these questions, the Comment will also address
the issue of survivability of damages for loss of enjoyment of life
(LOEL) in addition to compensation for pain, suffering, humiliation,
and other personal noneconomic loss.
Part One begins by examining each of Washington's wrongful
death statutes to determine damage elements available under each.
This is necessary in order to determine just exactly what damages will
survive under the survival statutes. The survival statutes are addressed
next.' A general overview of the survival statutes is followed by an
Every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, child or children,
including stepchildren, of the person whose death shall have been so caused. If there
be no wife or husband or such child or children, such action may be maintained for the
benefit of the parents, sisters or brothers, who may be dependent upon the deceased
person for support, and who are resident within the United States at the time of his
death. In every such action the jury may give such damages as, under all circumstances
of the case, may to them seem just.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.020 (1996).
There is also a child's wrongful death statute, title 4, chapter 24, section 010, of the
Washington Revised Code, entitled "Action for Injury of Death of Child." That statute provides:
The mother or father or both may maintain an action as plaintiff for the injury or death
of a minor child, or a child on whom either, or both, are dependent for support:
PROVIDED, That in the case of an illegitimate child the this section creates only one
cause of action, but if the parents of the child are not married, are separated, or not
married to each other damages may be awarded to each plaintiff separately, as the court
finds just and equitable. In such an action, in addition to damages for medical, hospital,
medication expenses, and loss of services and support, damages may be recovered for
the loss of love and companionship of the child and for injury to or destruction of the
parent-child relationship in such amount as, under all the circumstances of the case, may
be just.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1996).
3. 1993 Wash. Laws Ch. 44, § 1, in the first sentence of subsec. (1), rewrote the proviso,
which previously read: "PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That no personal representative shall be
entitled to recover damages for pain and suffering, anxiety, emotional distress, or humiliation
personal to and suffered by a deceased .. "
4. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.20.010, 4.20.020, 4.24.010 (wrongful death statutes), 4.20.046,
4.20.060 (survival statutes).
5. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (1996) and WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1996).
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in-depth discussion of the 1993 amendment to the general survival
statute. There is presently no case law construing the new statute; all
of the cases construe the older version, which has language completely
contradictory to the new statute for some damages-specifically pain,
suffering, anxiety, emotional distress, humiliation, and other nonecono-
mic damages. The purpose and result of the change in the language
and its effects on damage recovery, both intended and unintended, will
then be explored. This part concludes that the 1993 amended language
in the general survival statute was intended to close a loophole in the
law and that the effect of the language is simply to parallel the
damages already available under the special survival statute.
In Part Two, specific damage elements for survival actions are
examined. Workable definitions corresponding to Washington's case
treatment for each of the noneconomic damages are proposed. Special
care is directed to distinguishing between the noneconomic damages of
loss of enjoyment of life (LOEL) and physical disability. This
Comment recognizes the treatment of LOEL in Kirk v. Washington
State University6 as a fair and workable definition for Washington law.
Because LOEL and disability are conceptually distinct, and because
each is compensated in the personal injury context, the argument is
that each should be recognized as separately compensable under
Washington's two survival statutes.
In Part Three, the wrongful death and survival statutes are
examined in combination. The focus here is on bringing as many
causes of action and elements of damage as possible while avoiding
duplication of damages.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF WASHINGTON'S WRONGFUL
DEATH AND SURVIVAL STATUTES
A. The Wrongful Death Statutes
Survival actions generally accompany an action for wrongful
death.' Consequently, in order to fully understand Washington's two
6. 109 Wash. 2d 448, 746 P.2d 285 (1987).
7. The general survival statute is codified at title 4, chapter 20, section 046, of the
Washington Revised Code--Survival of Actions. The statute provides:
(1) All causes of action by a person or persons against another person or persons shall
survive to the personal representatives of the former and against the personal
representatives of the latter, whether such actions arise on contract or otherwise, and
whether or not such actions would have survived at the common law or prior to the date
of enactment of this section: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That the personal
representative shall only be entitled to recover damages for pain and suffering, anxiety,
emotional distress, or humiliation personal to and suffer by a deceased on behalf of
1998]
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survival statutes, a brief discussion of the wrongful death statutes is
necessary. Washington's two wrongful death statutes are the general
wrongful death statute8 and the parents' right of action for the death
of a child (child's death).9 This section distinguishes the two wrongful
death statutes according to (1) who may bring the action, (2) who is
the beneficiary, and (3) what damages are available.
1. General Wrongful Death
Wrongful death actions did not exist at common law.' ° They are
statutory creations which create a new cause of action for the named
beneficiaries, 1 in order to compensate the bereaved family members
directly. Washington's first wrongful death statute, which was enacted
in 1854, provided a cause of action solely for the benefit of widows and
children of men killed in duels. 12 Fortunately, the last 144 years have
seen considerable development in the scope of available remedies and
those beneficiaries enumerated in RCW 4.20.020, and such damages are recoverable
regardless of whether or not the death was occasioned by the injury that is the basis for
the action. The liability of property of a husband and wife held by them as community
property to execution in satisfaction of a claim enforceable against such property so held
shall not be affected by the death of either or both spouses; and a cause of action shall
remain an asset as though both claiming spouses continued to live despite the death of
either or both claiming spouses.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (1996).
The Special Survival Statute is codified at title 4, chapter 20, section 060, of the Washington
Revised Code-Action for personal injury survives to surviving spouse, child, stepchildren, or
heirs. The statute provides:
No action for a personal injury to any person occasioning death shall abate, nor shall
such right of action determine, by reason of such death, if such person has a surviving
spouse or child living, including stepchildren, or leaving no surviving spouse or such
children, if there is dependent upon the deceased for support and resident within the
United States at the time of decedent's death, parents, sisters or brothers; but such
action may be prosecuted, or commenced and prosecuted, by the executor or
administrator of the deceased, in favor of such surviving spouse, or in favor of the
surviving spouse and such children, or if no surviving spouse, in favor of such child or
children, or if no surviving spouse or such child or children, then in favor of the
decedent's parents, sisters or brothers who may be dependent upon such person for
support, and resident in the United States at the time of decedent's death.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1996).
8. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.20.010-.020 (1996).
9. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1996).
10. Cooper v. Runnels, 48 Wash. 2d 108, 110, 291 P.2d 657, 658 (1955) (quoting the
English maxim, "A personal action dies with the person").
11. Gray v. Goodson, 61 Wash. 2d 319, 326-27, 378 P.2d 413, 417 (1963); Upchurch v.
Hubbard, 29 Wash. 2d 559, 563, 188 P.2d 82, 85 (1947). Upchurch was overruled in part by
Sargeant v. Selvar, 46 Wash. 2d 271, 280 P.2d 683 (1955) on other grounds.
12. See Casey, supra note 1, at 314 (citing Civil Practice Act, § 496 Wash. Terr. Sess. Laws
220 (1854)).
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the potential beneficiaries under Washington's wrongful death
statutes.'3
Under the wrongful death statutes, 4 an action may be brought
by the personal representative of the deceased.'" The personal
representative is the plaintiff in name only: the right to the benefit of
the cause of action vests in the statutory beneficiaries.' 6  This
statutorily created interest is comparable to a property right. 7 The
new cause of action created by the statute is intended to compensate
the beneficiaries for the loss of economic and other benefits the
deceased would have provided, and any recovery does not become an
asset of the decedent's estate.' 8
The primary statutory beneficiaries, the decedent's spouse,
children,' 9 and stepchildren, automatically have standing to bring the
action.2" The secondary statutory beneficiaries, composed of the
decedent's parents, sisters, and brothers, only have standing if there are
no primary beneficiaries, and if they can show financial dependency on
the deceased.2 Dependency does not mean total dependency, but
some dependency is required.22 The required financial dependency
has been described as "a substantial need on one side and a substantial
financial recognition of that need on the other side . [.]""
Although the damages to which the statutory beneficiaries are
entitled are not listed in the statute, Washington courts have inter-
preted the statute as allowing compensation for the actual pecuniary
loss suffered by the surviving beneficiaries.24 Pecuniary loss includes
not only the monetary contributions which would have been made by
13. See Parrish v. Jones, 44 Wash. App. 449, 722 P.2d 878 (1986). See generally 6 WASH.
PRAC. 281, WPI 31.00 (1988).
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.010 (1996) and WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.020 (1996).
15. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.010 (1996); see also Wood v. Dunlop, 83 Wash. 2d 719, 724,
521 P.2d 1177, 1180 (1974).
16. Wood, 83 Wash. 2d at 724, 521 P.2d at 1180 (1974).
17. Id. (citing Gray v. Goodson, 61 Wash. 2d 319, 328, 378 P.2d 413, 419 (1963)).
18. Id.; see also Parrish, 44 Wash. App. at 455, 722 P.2d at 882.
19. The term "children" includes illegitimate children. Armijo v. Wesselius, 73 Wash. 2d
716, 440 P.2d 471 (1968).
20. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.020 (1996).
21. Cook v. Rafferty, 200 Wash. 234, 240, 93 P.2d 376, 379 (1939) (interpreting REM.
REV. STAT. § 183, 183-1); Masunaga v. Gapasin (Masunaga II), 57 Wash. App. 624, 629, 790
P.2d 171, 174-75 (1990), review denied, 115 Wash. 2d 1012, 798 P.2d (1990).
22. Cook, 200 Wash. at 239, 93 P.2d 379; Masunaga II, 57 Wash. App. at 631, 790 P.2d
at 175 (1990).
23. Masunaga II, 57 Wash. App. at 628, 790 P.2d at 173 (quoting Bortle v. Northern Pac.
Ry. Co., 60 Wash. 552, 556, 111 P. 788, 789 (1910)); see also Cook, 200 Wash. at 239, 93 P.2d
at 379.
24. Jensen v. Culbert, 134 Wash. 599, 605, 236 P. 101 (1925).
6291998]
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the decedent, but also includes the loss of decedent's support, services,
love, affection, care, companionship, training, society, and consor-
tium. 25 Damages are not available for the mental anguish, grief, or
sorrow of the survivors.26 Damage awards are apportioned according
to the actual loss suffered by each beneficiary.27 Pecuniary damages
are discounted to present worth.2
2. Child's Injury or Death
The Washington child's wrongful death statute provides a cause
of action for the parents of an injured or deceased child.29  This
action may be brought by either or both of the parents, but in the case
of an illegitimate child, only one cause of action is created.3" If the
child's parents are separated or divorced, they must join together as
party plaintiffs, but damages will be separately awarded.31 Like the
general wrongful death statute, damages recovered do not become part
of the deceased's estate;32 this cause of action is strictly for the benefit
of the parents of the deceased child.33 The parents of a minor
child 34 need not be financially dependent on the child to have
standing.35 On the other hand, parents of an adult child must show
some substantial financial dependency to have standing.36 Parents
who have standing may bring actions under both the general wrongful
death statute and the child's wrongful death statute. However, to the
extent there are overlapping damages, parents will be required to elect
remedies under the available causes of action to avoid duplicating damages."
25. Chapple v. Ganger, 851 F. Supp. 1481, 1487 (E.D. Wash. 1994); Myers v. Harter, 76
Wash. 2d 772, 783, 459 P.2d 25, 32 (1969).
26. Chapple, 851 F. Supp. at 1487.
27. Parrish v. Jones, 44 Wash. App. at 454, 722 P.2d at 881.
28. Hinzman v. Palmanteer, 81 Wash. 2d at 335-36, 501 P.2d at 1233-34.
29. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1996).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Masunaga v. Gapasin (Masunaga I), 52 Wash. App. 61, 65, 757 P.2d 550, 552 (1988).
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010; Masunaga 1, 52 Wash. App. at 65, 757 P.2d at 552.
34. The term "minor child" also includes a viable unborn fetus. Moen v. Hanson, 85
Wash. 2d 597, 599, 537 P.2d 266, 268 (1975) (allowing the parents to claim damages for injury
to the parent-child relationship).
35. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1996).
36. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1996); Masunaga 1, 52 Wash. App. at 67, 757 P.2d at
554 (1988). In Masunaga, the court noted that a cause of action under title 4, chapter 24, section
010, of the Washington Revised Code was available to parents of a child who had reached the age
of majority. The Masunaga court also ruled that language to the contrary contained within Moen
v. Hansen was dicta.
37. Masunaga 1, 52 Wash. App. at 65 n.2, 757 P.2d at 552 n.2. "Election of remedies is
the liberty of choosing (or the act of choosing) one out of several means afforded by the law for
[Vol. 21:625
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The three areas of damages available under the child's death
statute are (1) compensation for the loss of the child's love and
companionship, (2) compensation for injury to the parent-child
relationship, and (3) compensation for loss of the child's services and
support.38 In addition, parents may recover for the child's past and
future medical, hospital, medication expenses,39 as well as funeral
expenses.4" However, the statute does not provide the parents with
damages for the child's predeath pain and suffering.4'
Recovery for a child's loss of love and companionship compen-
sates the parents for the value of the child's "mutual society and
protection. 4 2 In addition, parents may seek compensation for injury
to, or destruction of, the parent-child relationship.43 This compensa-
tion is intended to alleviate the parental grief, mental anguish, anxiety,
and suffering accompanying the loss.44  These two elements of
damage are each separately compensable.45
Parents may also recover for the economic damages sustained by
the loss of the child's "services and support."46 Loss of "services and
support" damages is based on the anticipated contributions the
the redress of an injury, or one out of several available forms of action. An 'election of remedies'
arises when one having two coexistent but inconsistent remedies chooses to exercise one, in which
event he loses the right to thereafter exercise the other." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 518 (6th
ed. 1990).
38. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1996).
39. Chapple, 851 F. Supp. at 1492.
40. Hinton v. Carmody et al., 182 Wash. 123, 131, 45 P.2d 32, 35 (1935); Skidmore v.
Seattle, 138 Wash. 340, 244 P. 545, 547 (1926) (affirming trial court's award of $140 in burial
expenses). Typically, a claim for funeral expenses will be brought under title 4, chapter 20,
section 046, of the Washington Revised Code, the general survival statute. Which statute a claim
of burial expenses is brought under may not be important in any case, as Washington courts have
held that in the absence of a statute, burial expenses may be claimed as a matter of common law.
See Philby v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 46 Wash. 173, 89 P. 468 (1907); Castner v. Tacoma Gas,
126 Wash. 657, 219 P. 12 (1926).
41. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1996). Cavazos v. Franklin, 73 Wash. App. 116, 122,
867 P.2d 674, 678 (1994), is an apparently anomalous case where the court awarded the parents
damages for their child's predeath pain and suffering. The court asserted that this element of
damages is available to the parents but provided no citation. The statute makes no reference to
any damage elements suffered by the child as being compensable to the parents. Moreover, it is
not included in the Washington Pattern Instruction as an element for damages in the jury
instruction, which in fact lists only pecuniary damages as available to the parents. See 6 WASH.
PRAC., 252-53, WPI 30.06 (1990). Even though not all damages are listed in the Washington
Pattern Instruction, the Cavazos court probably misstated the law when it held that parents could
recover-under this statute-for their child's predeath pain and suffering.
42. Hinzman v. Palmanteer, 81 Wash. 2d at 332, 501 P.2d at 1231.
43. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1996).
44. Hinzman, 81 Wash. 2d at 332, 501 P.2d at 1231.
45. Chapple v. Ganger, 851 F. Supp. at 1492.
46. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1996).
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deceased (or injured) child would have made to his or her parents'
support.47 The period over which these losses are measured is not
limited to the child's minority.48
As the above discussion illustrates, there are many potentially
overlapping damage elements when bringing a wrongful death claim.
It is important to keep the various available damages in mind, not only
because Washington's survival statute does not name all of the
available damages, but also in order to avoid duplicating damages.
B. The Survival Statutes
There are two survival statutes in Washington, the general
survival statute49 and the special survival statute."0 Though worded
differently, the major difference between the two statutes is the
beneficiary: the general survival statute preserves the decedent's cause
of action for his estate, while the special survival statute preserves the
decedent's cause of action for the decedent's statutory beneficiaries.
Neither statute creates a new cause of action in the beneficiaries.
1. General Survival Statute
The general survival statute,"' differs from the special survival
statute5 2 in that it continues any causes of action that the decedent
could have brought himself prior to death,"3 regardless of the ultimate
cause of death, that is, the decedent's death may be unrelated to the
injury for which compensation is sought. The special survival statute,
on the other hand, is limited only to claims for personal injury
resulting in death. 4
Other differences between the two statutes are the person who
may bring suit and the beneficiary of the action. 5 The second of
47. Hinzman, 81 Wash. 2d at 332, 501 P.2d at 1231.
48. Balmer v. Dilley, 81 Wash. 2d 367, 372, 502 P.2d 456, 459 (1972).
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (1996); see supra, note 7.
50. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1996); see supra, note 7.
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (1996).
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1996).
53. Cavazos v. Franklin, 73 Wash. App. at 119, 867 P.2d 676. Interestingly, this action
was brought, and allowed, on behalf of a viable unborn fetus, killed when the pregnant mother
was involved in an auto accident.
54. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1996).
55. For example, a special survival action (WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060) must be brought
by the executor or administrator of the decedent's estate. In contrast, under the general survival
statute (WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046), the action must be brought by the decedent's personal
representative; this may be the same person simply acting in different capacities. See also Cavazos
v. Franklin (father, acting as both personal representative and administrator, brought wrongful
death and general survival claims as well as child's death claim).
[Vol. 21:625
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these distinctions, concerning the beneficiary, is much more important.
An action under the special survival statute must be brought for the
benefit of the named beneficiaries, and it is not an asset of the
estate.56 On the other hand, an action under the general survival
statute is strictly for the benefit of the estate.57 This distinction
between beneficiaries is crucial when arguing that damages are not
duplicative.
Prior to the 1993 amendment there was another important
distinction between the two statutes: damages for pain and suffering
by the decedent were available to the beneficiaries under the special
survival statute but were not available to the estate and its creditors
under the general survival statute.58 As the following discussion will
establish, the elimination of this distinction is what prompted the
legislature to amend the general survival statute in 1993.
2. Special Survival Statute
The special survival statute, also known as the death by personal
injury statute,59 is intended to accompany the wrongful death stat-
ute.6° Unlike the wrongful death statutes, however, the special
survival statute does not create a new cause of action in the beneficia-
ries; rather, it provides that an individual's claims for personal injury
resulting in death survives to the decedent's statutorily defined
beneficiaries.61 Essentially, this statute preserves to the statutory
beneficiaries certain causes of action for personal injuries that the
decedent could have brought had he or she survived.62
Damages under the special survival statute are not an asset of the
estate, and therefore they are beyond the reach of creditors.63 The
56. See, eg., Parrish v Jones, 44 Wash. App. at 455, 722 P.2d at 882.
57. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1996), with WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046
(1996). See also Walton v. Absher Construction Co., Inc., 101 Wash. 2d 238, 242, 244-245, 676
P.2d 1002, 1003, 1005-1006 (1984) (discussing legislative history and concluding that the statutes
can be harmonized).
58. Compare 1961 Wash. Laws Ch. 137, § 1 (current statute codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.20.046 (1996)), with WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060; see infra, note 66.
59. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1996). Action for personal injury survives to surviving
spouse, child, stepchildren, or heirs.
60. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.010 (1996). See also Casey, supra note 1, at 322; 6 WASH.
PRAC. 280, WPI 31.00 (1988).
61. See Casey, supra note 1, at 322; see also Higbee v. Shorewood Osteopathic Hospital, 105
Wash. 2d 33, 38, 711 P.2d 306, 309 (1985).
62. See Warner v. McCaughan, 77 Wash. 2d 178, 460 P.2d 272 (1969), reh'g denied, (1970).
63. Higbee, 105 Wash. 2d at 38, 711 P.2d at 309; but compare Chapple v. Ganger, 851 F.
Supp. at 1485 (stating that title 4, chapter 20, section 060, of the Washington Revised Code
damages go to the decedent's estate).
1998]
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claim must be brought by the executor or the administrator of the
decedent's estate.64 Spouses, children, and stepchildren need not be
dependent on the decedent to recover, but, as required by the general
wrongful death statute, parents and siblings must prove some financial
dependency.63
II. THE 1993 AMENDMENT LANGUAGE IN THE GENERAL
SURVIVAL STATUTE WAS INTENDED TO CLOSE A
LOOPHOLE IN THE LAW
A. Pre-1993 Amendment Damages
The 1993 amendment is susceptible to confusion, and the lack of
clarifying case law compounds the problem. Therefore, the approach
to finding available damages is to review those damages available prior
to 1993,66 and then to examine the effect of the amended language.
This will necessarily involve examining the legislative history behind
the amendment. As the discussion will illustrate, the new language
was intended to close a loophole in the law and allow more claims.
The amendment was not intended to limit a plaintiffs available
damages; instead, the 1993 amendment allows for all causes of action
to survive, in spite of the confusing and apparently contradictory
language used in the amendment.
Prior to the 1993 amendment, Washington courts generally held
that damages under the general survival statute should be construed
liberally in order to mitigate the harshness of the common law.67
Consequently, the courts gave the statute a broad reading, holding that
64. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060; Warner, 77 Wash. 2d at 179, 460 P.2d at 273 (1969);
but see Higbee, 105 Wash. 2d at 38, 711 P.2d at 309 (1985) (title 4, chapter 20, section 060, of
the Washington Revised Code applies to actions brought by personal representative on behalf of
statutory beneficiaries).
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1996).
66. The pre-1993 general survival statute, title 4, chapter 20, section 046, of the
Washington Revised Code, "Survival of Actions," provided:
(1) All causes of action by a person or persons against another person or persons shall
survive to the personal representatives of the former and against the personal
representatives of the latter, whether such actions arise on contract or otherwise, and
whether or not such actions would have survived at the common law or prior to the date
of enactment of this section: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that no personal representa-
tive shall be entitled to recover damages for pain and suffering, anxiety, emotional
distress, or humiliation personal to and suffered by a deceased on behalf of those
beneficiaries enumerated in RCW 4.20.020 and such damages are recoverable regardless
of whether or not the death was occasioned by the injury that is the basis for the action.
1961 Wash. Laws ch. 137, § 1.
67. See, e.g., Mickelson v. Williams, 54 Wash. 2d 293, 298-99, 340 P.2d 770, 773 (1959).
At common law, a cause of action did not survive the death of the complainant.
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all causes of action survived except those specifically enumerated.6"
Washington courts have awarded damages under the general survival
statute for burial and funeral expenses69 and for general damages,
including permanent injury7" and diminished earning capacity.71
Damages specifically excluded by the statute were not available; these
included pain and suffering, anxiety, emotional distress, or humiliation
personally suffered by the decedent.7 ' But all other damages were
available to the decedent's estate, even if otherwise personal to the
decedent.7 3
B. Post-1993 Damages
The 1993 amendment includes language that can be misleading.
The general survival statute74 was amended in 1993. 75 Prior to
1993, all causes of action survived the decedent, regardless of whether
such action occasioned the decedent's death.76 However, damages for
pain, suffering, anxiety, emotional distress and humiliation suffered by
the decedent were excluded.77
68. See Johnson v. Department of Labor and Industries, 114 Wash. 2d 479, 788 P.2d 551
(1990) (holding that Workers Compensation claims under title 51, chapter 32, section 040, of the
Washington Revised Code survive only to the statutory beneficiaries and do not survive to the
decedent's estate under title 4, chapter 20, section 046, of the Washington Revised Code); Warner
v. McCaughan, 77 Wash. 2d at 182, 460 P.2d at 275 (1970) (quoting Harvey v. Cleman, 65
Wash. 2d 853, 857, 400 P.2d 87, 90 (1965): In unequivocal language the legislature has
established that "[a]ll causes of action survive ... [except] damages for 'pain and suffering,
anxiety, emotional distress or humiliation personal to and suffered by a deceased.").
69. Warner, 77 Wash. 2d at 180, 460 P.2d at 273.
70. Id. at 178, 460 P.2d at 272 (also referred to as disability in consequence of a medical
condition).
71. Id.; Zimny v. Lovric, 59 Wash. App. 737, 742 n.5, 801 P.2d 259, 262 n.5 (1990)
(citing Kubista v. Romaine, 14 Wash. App. 58. 62-63, 538 P.2d 812 (1978), affd, 87 Wash. 2d
62, 549 P.2d 491 (1976) (defining diminished earning capacity-"a permanent diminution in the
ability to earn money, then the plaintiff should be entitled to compensation for what is generally
called 'impaired earning capacity"')). When death is unrelated to the injury upon which the cause
of action is based, the estate may only recover for the decedent's impaired earnings up until death.
Zimny at 744, 801 P.2d at 263.
72. 1961 Wash. Laws Ch. 137, § I (current statute codified at WASH. REV. CODE §
4.20.046 (1996)); see supra, note 66.
73. Warner, 77 Wash. 2d at 182-83, 460 P.2d at 275.
74. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (1996).
75. 1993 Wash. Laws Ch. 44, § 1.
76. 1961 Wash. Laws Ch. 137, § 1 (current statute codified at WASH. REV. CODE §
4.20.046 (1996)); see supra, note 66.
77. Id. See also Harvey v. Cleman, 65 Wash. 2d 853, 400 P.2d 87 (1965) for a good
historical discussion of the development of Washington's general survival statute. The court notes
that the original legislative intent behind the statute was that all causes of action should survive
the death of the decedent, whether the action caused his death or not. The statute, however, was
amended on the House floor to exclude damages for pain and suffering. The court noted the
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The 1993 amendment changed the language of the statute. Prior
to the amendment, the statute stated that a personal representative"shall not" recover for pain and suffering, anxiety, emotional distress,
or humiliation suffered by the decedent.78 After the amendment, the
statute states that a personal representative "shall only" recover for the
decedent's pain, suffering, anxiety and humiliation suffered personal to
the decedent.79 Reading the statute, it might appear that only pain,
suffering, and emotional distress damages are recoverable, and that
economic damages or other noneconomic damages that had previously
been available were not recoverable. This interpretation, however,
would be wrong. It is clear from the legislative history that the
language was changed, not to limit recovery to claims for pain and
suffering, but to close a loophole in the law.8"
The pre-1993 general survival statute denied recovery for pain and
suffering when the decedent's death was caused by something other
than the personal injury upon which the action was based.81 This
provided a loophole for insurance companies dealing with elderly
people because it encouraged them to use delaying tactics to wait as
long as possible in settling the people's claims.82 If an elderly victim
passed away from causes unrelated to the injury before the insurance
company agreed to a settlement, damages for pain and suffering would
be denied to his or her estate.8 3
The reason for this result was that, while damages for pain and
suffering were available to the decedent's statutory beneficiaries under
the special survival statute, once death occurred from a source
unrelated to the source of the injury the special survival statute no
longer applied-the general survival statute did. Prior to the amend-
existence of a Judicial Council Study & Report of the problem of the survival cause of action, in
which the council noted that the only objection to permitting all causes of action to survive the
death of either party appeared to be a fear that such legislation would have a serious effect upon
insurance rates. The council doubted the validity of that argument. Nevertheless, the Legislature
amended the council's recommendaton by excluding pain and suffering damages. Id. at 856-57,
400 P.2d at 89.
78. See 1961 Wash. Laws Ch. 137, § 1 (current statute codified at WASH. REV. CODE §
4.20.046 (1996)); see supra, note 66.
79. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (1996).
80. House Bill Report, SB 5077, at 1-2, reported by House Committee on Judiciary (1993)
[hereinafter HBR]. See also 1993 Final Legislative Report, 53 Wash. Legis. SB 5077, at 217.
81. See 1961 Wash. Laws Ch. 137, § 1 (current statute codified at WASH. REV. CODE §
4.20.046 (1996)); see supra, note 66. An example of this situation would be a person who is
injured in a car accident, but not killed, but before she can collect damages for her automobile
injury, she dies from a disease or other unrelated cause.
82. See HBR, supra note 80.
83. See 1961 Wash. Laws Ch. 137, § 1 (current statute codified at WASH. REV. CODE §
4.20.046 (1996)); see supra, note 66.
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ment, the general survival statute explicitly excluded damages for pain
and suffering, emotional distress, anxiety, and humiliation.84 Essen-
tially, the 1993 amendment was meant to bring the general survival
statute into line with the special survival statute, by adding compensa-
tion for pain and suffering, humiliation, and anxiety suffered personal
to the decedent and was meant to eradicate these delay tactics.8"
The legislative history and purpose behind the 1993 amendment
illustrate that despite the language apparently specifying available
damages, the intended effect of this amendment is that all causes of
action, and both economic and noneconomic damages, survive to the
decedent's estate. It is immaterial if the injury occasioned the
decedent's death.86 In summary, the intended effect of the amend-
ment was to insure that all claims previously available under the
general survival statute prior to the 1993 amendment, as well as pain
and suffering, anxiety, emotional distress, and humiliation, personal to
and suffered by the decedent, be compensable-just as under the
special survival statute.
There may also be unintended benefits to this amendment. In the
past, the courts have excluded certain claims from the old general
survival statute, claims in addition to the elements of pain and
suffering and mental anguish, because they were considered similar to
pain and -suffering and mental anguish. Claims for elements such
as loss of enjoyment of life88 and the tort of outrage89 are examples
of claims denied on these grounds. Now, pain and suffering, anxiety,
emotional distress, and humiliation suffered by the decedent are
compensable. 9° Therefore, there appears to be no strong argument
why tort claims such as outrage,9 negligent infliction of emotional
distress, libel and slander, constitutional right to privacy92 and 42
84. Id.
85. See HBR, supra note 80.
86. See id.
87. See, e.g., Blodgett v. Olympic Savings and Loan Ass'n, 32 Wash. App. 116, 125, 646
P.2d 139, 145 (1982).
88. Id.
89. See Strickland v. Deaconess Hospital, 47 Wash. App. 262, 265-266, 735 P.2d 74, 76
(1987).
90. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (1996).
91. See Babcock v. State, 112 Wash. 2d 83, 768 P.2d 481 (1989) (denying alienation of
affection and outrage claim); Strickland, 47 Wash. App. at 265-266, 735 P.2d at 76 (denying
Constitutional right to privacy claim, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, and outrage claim under pre-1993
title 4, chapter 20, section 046, of the Washington Revised Code survival statute as nature of
anxiety, emotional distress, humiliation).
92. Strickland, 47 Wash. App at 262, 735 P.2d at 74.
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U.S.C. § 1983"3 claims should not also survive to the decedent's
estate.94
III. LOSS OF ENJOYMENT OF LIFE SHOULD BE COMPENSABLE
AS A SEPARATE ELEMENT OF DAMAGES UNDER WASHINGTON'S
SURVIVAL STATUTES
A. Noneconomic Damages Available in a Personal Injury Action
Noneconomic damages available under the survival statutes are the
main topic of this part of the Comment. But, before addressing
noneconomic damages, a brief mention of economic damages is in
order. The Washington Pattern Jury Instructions (WPI) for personal
injury include a separate section dealing with the numerous types of
economic damages, covering everything from medical expenses to lost
earnings to recovery for property damage.9 Because these damages
are well set out in the instructions, they will not be covered individual-
ly here.
Both the general survival statute96 and the special survival
statute97 allow the plaintiff, whether it be the statutory beneficiaries
or the decedent's estate, to collect for personal injuries suffered by the
decedent. Because compensable damages should be the same under
both statutes, the following discussion applies to either a general or a
special survival action.
The WPI do not include a separate set of instructions for survival
actions. Nevertheless this Comment's examination of the damages
contemplated in a personal injury action under Washington case law,
as well as the damages named in the WPI for personal injury, will
show a picture of the available damages. In theory, damage elements
available under the special survival statute are those which may be
claimed in a personal injury action. However, it is unclear exactly
what damages are available to the decedent's personal representative,
because the injured person is dead and because the measure of certain
elements of damage as applied to a deceased plaintiff are undefined.
A succinct listing of damages generally available in a personal injury
93. Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. III. 1985), affd, 827 F.2d 195, 206 (7th Cir.
1987), vacated, 835 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1987), rev 'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir.
1988).
94. Washington courts have yet to rule on the amended general survival statute's effect on
these extended claims. A detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
95. See 6 WASH. PRAC. 254-275, WPI 30.07-30.18 (1988).
96. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (1996).
97. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1996).
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action, both economic and noneconomic, is found in Parris v.
Johnson 8
The elements of compensatory damages for personal injuries are:
(1) pain incident to physical injury, commonly called physical pain;
(2) various forms of mental suffering and anguish; (3) actual loss of
time or earnings and impairment of earning capacity; (4) reasonable
cost of necessary medical treatment, hospital care, nursing services,
and related expenses; (5) physical disability or what is properly
referred to as the incapacity to lead a normal life; and (6) other
expenses incurred because of the injuries.99
Likewise, the WPI for a personal injury action includes both
economic and noneconomic damages.' °  Both past and future
economic damages are allowed, and all damages, both economic and
noneconomic, must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.'
Further, noneconomic damages require a "reasonable basis" for
computation in order to be considered by the jury.'0 2 The WPI for
noneconomic damage includes past and future pain and suffering0 3
disability, disfigurement, and loss of enjoyment of life (LOEL) 4
Yet, several problems result when transmuting damages for
personal injury into damages under a survival action. First, as
previously mentioned, there are no WPI jury instructions for a survival
action. Second, disability and LOEL are not defined. Third, LOEL
has not yet been awarded in a survival action in Washington.
B. Compensating LOEL and Disability Under
Washington's Survival Statutes
Before addressing the more esoteric damages of disability and
LOEL, it will be helpful to review what has already been awarded by
Washington courts in survival actions. To reiterate, because the two
survival statutes allow for the same recovery, damages that were
previously only available to the beneficiaries under the special survival
statute should also be available to the estate under the general survival
statute.' 05
98. 3 Wash. App. 853, 860 n.2, 479 P.2d 91, 95 n.2 (1970).
99. Id. (quoting 3 L Frurner, Personal Injury § 3.04(1) (1965)).
100. 6 WASH. PRAC. 13, WPI 30.01.01 (1990).
101. Id. at 14.
102. Id. at 16.
103. Id. at 23.
104. Id. at 22.
105. See discussion supra, Part II.B.
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Tort damages awarded by Washington courts under the special
survival statute include medical and hospital expenses incurred prior
to death, 116 property damage, 107 and, if death was not instanta-
neous, pain and suffering experienced prior to death.' The courts
have also awarded damages for fear suffered prior to death, even if
death was instantaneous.'1 9 These damages are all separately com-
pensable. In addition, damages for disability have also been al-
lowed."10
In the context of a personal injury action, Washington courts have
recognized claims for LOEL in addition to claims for pain and
suffering and physical disability."' Washington courts have yet to
award LOEL damages in a survival action. Because LOEL can be a
significant loss, even to someone who eventually dies, it should be
compensable in a survival action. Washington's case law on the issue,
however, is confusing and conflicting." 2 Some of the confusion can
be traced to the fact that the cases were brought under differing causes
of action, namely, a personal injury action as opposed to a survival
action, as well as to the fact that the survival action cases were decided
prior to the 1993 amendment." 3  There has also been apparent
misunderstanding by the trial courts as to the fundamental nature and
proper treatment of a claim for LOEL."4
106. Orcutt v. Spokane County, 58 Wash. 2d 846, 857, 364 P.2d 1102, 1108 (1961). The
court in Orcutt awarded damages to the surviving beneficiaries of a woman who suffered
disfiguring injuries in a car accident. She took her own life nearly two years after the accident due
to an "uncontrollable impulse" from a mental condition known as "post concussion syndrome"
caused by injuries sustained in the accident. Id. at 851.
107. Covery v. Western Tank Lines, Inc., 36 Wash. 2d 381, 218 P.2d 322 (1950).
108. Bingaman v. Grays Harbor Community Hosp., 103 Wash. 2d 831, 837, 699 P.2d
1230, 1234 (1985).
109. Id.; Chapple v. Ganger, 851 F. Supp. at 1486.
110. See Warner v. McCaughan, 77 Wash. 2d at 181, 460 P.2d at 274.
111. Kirk v. Washington State Univ., 109 Wash. 2d 448, 462, 746 P.2d 285, 293 (1987).
112. Compare Kirk, 109 Wash. 2d at 462, 746 P.2d at 293, with Wooldridge v. Woolett,
96 Wash. 2d 659, 664, 638 P.2d 566, 569 (1981) (holding that the value of person's shortened
life expectancy is not compensable), and Blodgett v. Olympic Savings and Loan Ass'n, 32 Wash.
App. 116, 125 646 P.2d 139, 145 (1982).
113. See Kirk, 109 Wash. 2d at 462, 746 P.2d at 293; cf. Blodgett, 32 Wash. App. at 125,
646 P.2d at 145.
114. See, e.g., Reed v. Jamieson Inv. Co., 168 Wash. 111, 113, 10 P.2d 977, 978 (1932)
(awarding damages for "traumatic neurosis" which is equated to damages for disability);
Wooldridge, 96 Wash. 2d at 665-666, 638 P.2d at 560-570 (loss of life's pleasures and amenities
is but a component of pain and suffering); Blodgett, 32 Wash. App. at 125, 646 P.2d at 146
(equating loss of life's pleasures and amenities with shortened life expectancy and denying
damages because it was but a "component of pain, suffering, anxiety, and distress"). All of these
cases were decided prior to the 1993 amendment and prior to Kirk.
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To begin, it is necessary to define loss of enjoyment of life in a
useful and logical way, and to distinguish it from other more tradi-
tional elements of damage such as pain, mental suffering, and
disability. The following section proposes nonoverlapping definitions
for the noneconomic damages that should be compensable and
addresses various objections to considering LOEL as a separate
element of damages.
1. Proposed Nonoverlapping Definitions for
Noneconomic Damages
The first step in understanding loss of enjoyment of life and
disability is to consider definitions for each of the other major
categories of noneconomic damages recognized by the courts. LOEL
is often considered an element of pain and suffering; consequently, it
is not classified as a separately compensable element of damages." 5
However, LOEL is conceptually distinct from pain and suffering and
disability. With LOEL and disability properly defined, independent
judicial recognition of LOEL in survival actions should follow.
Physical pain is a neurological response to physical injury to the
body."6 It is the "unpleasant sensation or feeling resulting from or
accompanying some injury ... [.]""' Also, it is described as a
"feeling of distress, suffering, or agony caused by the stimulation of
specialized nerve endings.""'  Pain is a physiological response whose
chief purpose is mainly protective: to warn the body that early tissue
damage is taking place."'
Pain is a subjective concept. Although to some extent the effects
of pain may be measured by various medical and physical tests, or may
be observed by doctors or layman, its effects are different for different
people. 2 ° One who faces pain stoically may suffer very little from
an injury while the same injury may be utter agony for a person with
a very low pain threshold.' Pain cannot be measured by objective
proof because the suffering and debilitation differs in each injured
115. Wooldridge, 96 Wash. 2d at 655-66, 638 P.2d at 560-70.
116. Carleton Robert Cramer, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Separate Element of Damages,
12 PAC. L.J. 965, 969 (1981).
117. FUNK AND WAGNALLS STANDARD DESK DICTIONARY 470 (1969).
118. Cramer, supra note 116, at 969 n.25 (citing B. MILLER & C. KEANE, ENCYCLOPEDIA
AND DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, NURSING & ALLIED HEALTH 742 (2nd ed. 1978)).
119. Id. at 969 n.26 (quoting B. MILLER & C. KEANE, ENCYCLOPEDIA AND DICTIONARY
OF MEDICINE, NURSING AND ALLIED HEALTH 742 (2d ed. 1978)).
120. Cramer, supra note 116, at 970.
121. Id.
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person. Accordingly, the measure of damages for pain is left to the
jury's assessment. 122
Distinct from physical pain is suffering. Suffering is the
emotional response accompanying a physical injury; it is derivative of
it.'23  Although suffering is a mental reaction to the painful physical
sensation, it is not a part of the pain experience: it is properly
considered as mental suffering. 24 Mental suffering may include
nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, shock, humiliation, indignity, and
fear. 125  In addition, mental suffering describes how the person feels
emotionally about the injury and the pain sensation. 126 A disfiguring
scar, a crippling injury, or an amputation, for example, will be a source
of mental suffering long after the physical pain of the injury has
ceased.
Another separate and identifiable injury is physical disability.
Physical disability127 is the incapacity to lead a normal life. 21 It
exists as a distinct and separate element of damages, though it
frequently accompanies pain and suffering.129 Disability means more
than impairment of work capacity. In a 24-hour day, one-third may
be devoted to work, one-third to sleep, and one-third to leisure; an
impairment of any of these aspects may be a disability.' A careful
study of cases awarding LOEL damages reveals that in many instances,
122. See 6 WASH. PRAC., 252-53, WPI 30.06 (1990).
123. Cramer, supra note 116, at 971.
124. Id.
125. Id.; Chapple v. Ganger, 851 F. Supp. at 1487 (fear); Gray v. Washington Water Power
Co., 30 Wash. 665, 71 P. 206 (1903) (cosmetic disfigurement).
126. Cramer, supra note 116, at 971.
127. See, e.g., Stephen T. Riley, The Economics of Hedonic Damages, 1-Sep NEV. LAW 24
(1993). Riley identifies four distinct areas where disability of functioning may be manifested.
These are: (1) Practical functioning, which includes the lack of ability to engage in reading, sports
activities, household activities, traveling, and shopping. The extent of the disability is shown by
comparing the individuals pre-injury to post-injury lifestyle. (2) Emotional/psychological
functioning, referring to the destabilizing effects the personal injury has on the individual's
emotional well-being. (3) Social functioning, relating to the diminished capacity of a person to
interact with individuals in a social setting. (4) Occupational functioning, which is the effect the
disability has on the individuals ability to remain gainfully employed. It also can relate to the
degree of post-injury job satisfaction as compared to pre-injury job satisfaction. Id. at 25 (citing
Berla, Brookshire and Smith, Hedonic Damages and Personal Injury: A Conceptual Approach, J.
FORENSIC ECON. 1-8 (1989)).
128. Parris v. Johnson, 3 Wash. App. 853, 860 n.2, 479 P.2d 91, 95 n.2 (1970) (quoting
3 L. FRUMER, PERSONAL INJURY § 3.04(1) (1965)).
129. Id. at 859-60, 479 P.2d at 95. As Washington courts have keenly recognized, "Man
does not live by bread alone." Id.
130. Id. at 860-61, 479 P.2d at 95 (citing 9 BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 386.3 (3d ed. 1967)).
[Vol. 21:625
Survivability Damages
LOEL is awarded only where there is no damage category of perma-
nent disability.'
The tendency of the courts to substitute LOEL for permanent
disability, or to equate LOEL with pain and suffering, elucidates the
problem of differing definitions. A more general definition sometimes
given to LOEL is the "deprivation or impairment of the senses or
one's ability to engage in those activities and perform those functions
which were part of the victim's life prior to the injury."' 32  Under
Washington law, however, a personal injury plaintiff may recover for
disability.'33 This compensates the person for the inability to lead
a normal life, which is essentially the same as the broad definition
given to LOEL. 134 Fortunately, the Washington Supreme Court has
provided a narrower definition of LOEL, which allows compensation
for the loss of special artistic or athletic abilities and does not duplicate
damages for permanent disability or pain and suffering.135 Under
this definition of LOEL, Washington courts allow recovery only for
loss of a specific unusual activities such as ballet dancing and other
artistic or athletic skills.'36
Washington's definition of LOEL does not duplicate damages for
lost earning capacity, which compensates for the economic value of a
special ability but does not include the noneconomic rewards of these
abilities.'37 As other courts have found, there can be an apparent
overlap of compensation for disability and LOEL; accordingly, in order
to avoid duplication of damages, it is crucial to identify the exact
nature of the injury for which compensation is being sought.
C. Washington's Treatment of LOEL
Several Washington cases have addressed the issue of whether to
compensate LOEL. 38 A brief look at this history shows that in the
131. See, e.g., Reed v. Jamieson Inv. Co., 168 Wash. at 112, 10 P.2d at 978; Flannery v.
United States, 297 S.E.2d 433, 438-439 (W. Va. 1982) (noting that if an award for permanent
injuries had been made, the additional award for LOEL "would have been an impermissible
duplication of damages").
132. Cramer, supra note 116, at 972.
133. Kirk, 109 Wash. 2d at 462, 746 P.2d at 292.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 461-62, 746 P.2d at 292 (and cases cited therein); see also Riddle v. Memorial
Hospital, 349 N.Y.S.2d 855 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973); cf. Lindsey v. Visitec, Inc., 804 F. Supp.
1340, 1345 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (holding that emotional distress from losing a loved one is not
a compensatory element of damages under the rubric of loss of enjoyment of life).
137. Kirk, 109 Wash. 2d at 462, 746 P.2d at 293.
138. See, e.g., Wooldridge v. Woolett, 96 Wash. 2d 659, 638 P.2d 566 (1981); Blodgett v.
Olympic Savings and Loan Ass'n, 32 Wash. App. 116, 646 P.2d 139 (1982); Parris v. Johnson,
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past the courts have had difficulty grappling with the concept. 139
The inconsistencies in definitions and the conceptual difficulties
involved with defining LOEL as a separately compensable element of
damages were finally laid to rest in Kirk v. Washington State Univer-
sity.140
Kirk was a personal injury action brought by a 20-year-old college
cheerleader who was injured at cheerleading practice.141 Kirk tum-
bled backwards off the shoulders of a male cheerleader and shattered
three bones in her elbow, resulting in a permanent disability.4 2 The
trial court had allowed a .separate jury instruction for "the reasonable
value of the lost opportunity or loss of chance to become a professional
dance performer."' 43 On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court
assumed that this instruction was equivalent to a "loss of enjoyment"
instruction. 44
In affirming LOEL as an allowable separate element of damages,
the court noted that it was not duplicative of any of the other types of
recovery available.'45 The court distinguished the loss compensable
in a disability claim from the loss compensable in a LOEL claim.
"Disability" compensates for the inability to lead a normal life, but this
"does not imply any recovery for loss of a specific unusual activity
such as ballet dancing." '146 In allowing LOEL damages, the court
cited a number of cases from other jurisdictions permitting recovery for
loss of "specific artistic or athletic *skills."'47  Furthermore, compen-
sation for LOEL is not limited to professionals: "Recovery for lost
wages or earning capacity compensates for economic value, but does
not include the noneconomic rewards to the dancer."' 48 Kirk herself
was an uncompensated cheerleader, not a professional dancer.'"
3 Wash. App. 853, 479 P.2d 91 (1920).
139. Id.
140. 109 Wash. 2d 448, 746 P.2d 285 (1987).
141. Id. at 450, 746 P.2d at 287.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 459-60, 746 P.2d at 292.
144. Id. at 460, 746 P.2d at 292.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. (citing Sutherland v. Auch Inter-Borough Transit Co., 366 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa.
1973); Thompson v. Tartler, 443 P.2d 365 (Colo. 1968); Locicero v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.,
399 So. 2d 712 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Grayson v. Irvmar Realty Corp., 184 N.Y.S.2d 33 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1959)). See also, Annotation, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Distinct Element or Factor
in Awarding Damages for Bodily Injury, 34 A.L.R. 4TH 293 (1996).
148. Kirk, 109 Wash. 2d at 460, 746 P.2d at 293.
149. Though some might disagree as to whether a scholarship or any other type of school




The Kirk Court also addressed two earlier Washington cases that
appeared inconsistent with the Kirk holding. The court clarified the
holding in Blodgett v. Olympic Savings and Loan' and disapproved
of Blodgett's interpretation of Wooldridge v. Woolett:15' that LOEL
was but a component of pain and suffering. The court pointed out
that, properly interpreted, Wooldridge merely held that recovery for
loss or impairment of capacity to enjoy life was barred by the express
language of the survival statute 52 "Wooldridge does not support a
conclusion that an instruction regarding enjoyment of life would be
barred in a personal injury action not governed by the survival
statute."153
Again, it must be remembered that when the Washington
Supreme Court clarified the treatment of LOEL in Kirk, the express
language of the general survival statute precluded recovery for this type
of claim-if one classifies it as a type of "pain and suffering, anxiety,
emotional distress, or humiliation personal to and suffered by a
deceased."'5 4 However, this is no longer a reason to bar recovery for
LOEL under the post-1993 general survival statute because the
amended statute expressly authorizes recovery for these types of
injuries.' Moreover, as the earlier discussion shows, the apparent
legislative intent in making the amendment was to add available
damages, not exclude them. 56 Similarly, the special survival statute
should also allow for recovery of LOEL because it continues all causes
of action for personal injury resulting in death.
As Kirk shows, Washington recognizes claims for LOEL as a
separately compensable element of damages in personal injury actions.
Because the purpose of the special survival statute is to continue these
causes of action to the decedent's beneficiaries, and because the post-
1993 general survival statute no longer precludes damages for pain,
suffering, anxiety and humiliation suffered by and personal to the
deceased, it follows that damages for LOEL should be compensable as
a separate element of damages under both the general5 7 and spe-
cial ' survival statutes.
150. 32 Wash. App. 116, 646 P.2d 139 (1982).
151. 96 Wash. 2d 659, 638 P.2d 566 (1981).
152. Kirk, 109 Wash. 2d at 461, 746 P.2d at 291.
153. Id.
154. See 1961 Wash. Laws Ch. 137, § 1 (current statute codified at WASH. REV. CODE §
4.20.046 (1996)); see supra, note 66.
155. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (1996).
156. See discussion supra, Part II.
157. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (1996).
158. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1996).
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In addition to providing just compensation for a plaintiffs actual
losses, separate categories of damages for pain, disability and LOEL
will also aid in appellate review by helping to avoid duplicated
damages." 9 Unlike a trial judge who may grant a new trial if, in his
opinion, the evidence indicates that the damage award is not commen-
surate with the plaintiffs injury, an appellate court may only order a
new trial if the damages are so inadequate or so excessive as to have
obviously resulted from the jury's passion or prejudice. 6 ' By
allowing separate categories of damages, including LOEL, the appellate
court can better determine whether the victim was adequately
compensated. 6' Likewise, separate categories of damages will give
plaintiffs more information aiding in the decision of whether to appeal
an excessively low award.' 62
Finally, although attorneys may ask for LOEL-type damages in
closing arguments, separate instructions for pain, disability, and LOEL
are appropriate because juries tend to trust judges more than attorneys.
Not receiving a separate instruction from the judge for LOEL may
lead juries to feel that they are not to compensate victims for those
injuries. 63  Conversely, without the separate instruction, the jury
may be left to speculate on what would be an appropriate award for
pain and suffering that includes LOEL. This could give rise to
apparently excessive awards because all the damage elements are not
itemized. 64
In the final analysis, Washington should recognize claims for
LOEL in survival actions. Not only does judicial recognition of
LOEL provide deserved relief to plaintiffs, but other benefits will also
accrue by recognizing LOEL as a separate element of damages. These
benefits include making judicial review of excessive damages easier and
helping juries to avoid duplicating damages.' 6 ' Moreover, recogni-
tion of LOEL in survival actions follows logically from the facts that
(1) Washington has already recognized LOEL in a personal injury
action;'66 (2) the special survival statute allows the plaintiff to recover
159. Cramer, supra note 116, at 982.
160. Id. at 984.
161. Id.
162. See John Dwight Ingram, Damages for Loss of the Enjoyment of Life, 24 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 423, 430 (1991).
163. Cramer, supra note 116, at 983.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 980, 984.




for personal injuries resulting in death; 67 and (3) the general survival
statute parallels the special survival statute by explicitly allowing for
damages for pain and suffering, anxiety, emotional distress, and
humiliation personally suffered by the decedent. 6 ' Consequently,
LOEL should also be a separately compensable element under
Washington's two survival statutes.
IV. THE NECESSITY OF DISTINGUISHING DAMAGES AND
BENEFICIARIES WHEN BRINGING WRONGFUL DEATH AND
SURVIVAL CLAIMS
A. General Wrongful Death and Child's Death
The issue of overlapping remedies is sure to be complicated by the
1993 amendment to the general survival statute.'69 It will be helpful
to address damages under the two wrongful death statutes in combina-
tion first because these will typically accompany a survival action.
A general wrongful death action,17° and a child's wrongful death
action,'7 ' may be brought together by qualifying parties.'72 To
qualify, parents bringing both actions must either be seeking damages
for the death of a minor child, or, if the decedent child was an adult,
the parents must be financially dependent on the child. 73  As
previously discussed, the parents need not be wholly dependent to
recover, but dependence must be substantial.'74 Emotional support
does not qualify as "support" because "emotional dependence" would
render the provision virtually meaningless. 7 As the Masunaga II
court recognized, "[a]lmost all parents depend on their children for
emotional satisfaction and are injured by the death of their child."' 76
The dependence must also be based on a current condition and not on
167. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1996).
168. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (1996).
169. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (1996).
170. Brought under title 4, chapter 20, section 010, of the Washington Revised Code.
171. Brought under title 4, chapter 24, section 010, of the Washington Revised Code.
172. Masunaga 1, 52 Wash. App. at 61, 757 P.2d at 550 (1988).
173. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.020; WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010; Masunaga I, at 67, 757
P.2d at 553 (holding verbiage to the contrary in Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d
266 (1965) to be dicta and a misstatement of the law in saying there are no causes of action for
adult children under 4.24.010.)
174. Masunaga II, 57 Wash. App. at 628, 790 P.2d at 173 (citing Joski v. Short, 1 Wash.
2d 454, 461, 96 P.2d 483, 487 (1939). See discussion of title 4, chapter 24, section 010, of the
Washington Revised Code, child's death statute, supra section I.B.
175. Masunaga II, 57 Wash. App. at 628, 790 P.2d at 173-174.
176. Id. (citing with approval Perry v. Medina, 237 Cal. Rptr. 532, 535 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987)).
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a promise of future services or on an expectation of future depen-
dence.177
Although the parental qualifications to bring a wrongful death and
a child's death claim are much alike, the two statutes themselves create
distinct causes of action.'78 The law recognizes that, although the
two actions may spring from the same wrongful act, distinct injuries
are inflicted. 79 "[T]he actions are prosecuted in different rights and
the damages are given upon different principles."' °  The damages
recovered by a parent under the child's death statute go to the parents
in their own right and are not distributable to the heirs. 8 ' In
contrast, damages under the general wrongful death statute are for the
benefit of the statutory beneficiaries as set out in title 4, chapter 20,
section 020, of the Washington Revised Code and are distributable
among them."8 2
B. Survival Actions Combined with Wrongful Death or Child's Death
The special survival statute,"3 is a component of the general
wrongful death statute," 4 and it provides an action for personal
injury to accompany an action for wrongful death. It also may
accompany an action under the child death statute.' The special
survival action is brought by the administrator or executor of the
decedent's estate for the benefit of the named beneficiaries. 8 6 So as
long as there are qualifying beneficiaries, this action may accompany
a wrongful death action under either the child's wrongful death
statute' 8 7 or the general wrongful death statute.'
177. Id. at 629, 790 P.2d at 174 (citing Grant v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 145 Wash. 31,
37, 258 P. 842, 844 (1927)).
178. Masunaga 1, 52 Wash. App. at 64, 757 P.2d at 552 (citing Hendrick v. Ilwaco Ry. &




182. Id. at 64 n.2, 757 P.2d at 552 n.2 (quoting Kanton v. Kelly, 65 Wash. 614, 622, 118
P. 890, 121 P. 833 (1911): "If, absent a surviving spouse or child, parents who are dependent
upon their child for support may benefit from recovery for their child's death under either RCW
4.20.010 and .020 or RCW 4.24.010, and there is an election of remedies.")
183. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1996).
184. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.010 (1996).
185. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1996).
186. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1996).
187. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1996).
188. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.24.010-020 (1996).
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Survivability Damages
Like an action under the special survival statute,'B9 a cause of
action under the general survival statute' 9 may also accompany
either wrongful death action. 191 Again, this is because a wrongful
death action creates a new cause in the decedent's beneficiaries, while
the survival action merely provides that a cause of action the decedent
could have brought surviv.es to the decedent's estate. Accordingly,
compatibility is not a problem.
C. Survival Actions Combined
The real question is the relation between the special survival
statute' 92 and the general survival statute.1 93  The Washington
Supreme Court has recognized that "RCW 4.20.060 does not impair
the efficacy of RCW 4.20.046; for we are convinced that the 'legisla-
ture was intent on preserving causes of action, rather than pleas of
abatement' when it adopted RCW 4.20.046 in 1961."' 9  The
statutes are recognized as compatible because the special survival
statute9 ' has a purpose distinct from the general survival statute. 96
Specifically, the special survival damages are for the statutory
beneficiaries and are not an asset of the estate; damages under the
general survival statute are an asset of the estate."'
Washington courts also have noted that the'special survival statute
allowed damages for pain and suffering suffered by the decedent while
189. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1996).
190. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (1996).
191. See Cavazos v. Franklin, 73 Wash. App. 116, 121, 867 P.2d 674, 677 (1994) (holding
that parents may bring wrongful death action (WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.020) and death of child
actions (WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010), and that there is an election of remedies; a parent, as
administrator, may bring a survival action under title 4, chapter 20, section 046, of the
Washington Revised Code.)
192. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1996).
193. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (1996).
194. Warner v. McCaughan, 77 Wash. 2d at 184, 460 P.2d at 276 (quoting Engen v.
Arnald, 61 Wash. 2d 641, 644, 379 P.2d 990, 993 (1963)).
195. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1996).
196. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (1996); see, e.g., Higbee v. Shorewood Osteopathic
Hospital, 105 Wash. 2d at 37, 711 P.2d at 309 (1985); see generally White v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 103 Wash. 2d 344, 693 P.2d 687 (1985); Walton v. Absher Construction Co., Inc., 101
Wash. 2d 238, 676 P.2d 1002 (1984); Parrish v. Jones, 44 Wash. App. 449, 722 P.2d 878 (1986).
197. But see Warner v. McCaughan, 77 Wash. 2d at 184, 460 P.2d at 276 (analyzing the
special survival statute, the court erroneously states that "it is not a statute creating a cause of
action in certain beneficiaries"). The court's statement is only partially true. Title 4, chapter 20,
section 060, of the Washington Revised Code is a survival statute: it does not create a new cause
of action, and consequently only the statutory beneficiaries may recover. It is the general survival
statute that goes to the decedent's estate and not to the statutory beneficiaries. Compare WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1996), with WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (1996).
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the general survival statute did not.' 9 On these grounds, the courts
deduced that the legislature intended to provide the decedent's
dependents with pain and suffering damages under the special survival
statute, while intending to deny the estate and its creditors pain and
suffering damages in actions under the general survival statute. 199
As the discussion in Part II concluded, after the 1993 amendment,
the damages available under each statute are the same, at least as far
as pain and suffering are concerned. 200  However, the beneficiaries of
the action are still different, namely, statutory beneficiaries under the
special survival statute20 ' and the decedent's estate under the general
survival statute.0 2 Because the beneficiaries are different, the causes
of action should still be considered separately compensable and
compatible with each other. Furthermore, the general survival
statute20 3 allows for a potentially wider range of claims because these
claims need not be restricted to personal injuries causing death.
Presumably, if the beneficiaries of a decedent's estate are the same
as the beneficiaries of the special survival statute, 2° and there are no
creditors against the estate, the court will require an election of
remedies to ensure that the beneficiaries are not compensated twice for
the same pain and suffering suffered by the decedent. Realistically,
however, except in the case of a child's death, it is unlikely that there
will be no creditors, so a clever attorney should be able to avoid that
dilemma. By carefully considering who the beneficiary of the action
is and what damages are available both to the estate of the deceased
and to the survivors of the deceased, and by taking care not to claim
the same damages for a statutory beneficiary that may be awarded to
the plaintiff as a beneficiary of the decedent's estate, it is possible to
maximize recovery without duplicating damages.
198. Walton, 101 Wash. 2d at 242-243, 676 P.2d at 1005.
199. Id.
200. See discussion supra, Part II.
201. WAsH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1996).
202. WAsH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (1996).
203. Id.




Washington state has seen many changes in its general survival
statute, and with the 1993 amendment it now seems to have come full
circle. As with the first general survival statute enacted in the territory
laws of 1869,2"' all causes of action survive the decedent even if his
death is not caused by those injuries.
The policy that a tortfeasor pay full damages for the injury he
inflicts requires that Washington courts fully recognize and embrace
LOEL as a separately compensable element of damages, not only in
personal injury actions, but in survival actions as well. To do
otherwise benefits the tortfeasor by allowing him to profit from the
death caused by himself or fortuitously caused by a subsequent event.
In either case, the tortfeasor gets an undeserved and morbid windfall.
This should not be countenanced by Washington's laws. Moreover,
the Washington Legislature evidenced its distaste for loopholes in 1993
when it amended the general survival statute to abolish the tactics of
unethical insurance defenders. The legislative policy clearly leans in
the direction of providing full compensation for injuries sustained,
regardless of whether the injured lives. And it shuns the idea of
denying the decedent's survivors just compensation.
205. See Cooper v. Runnels, 48 Wash. 2d 108, 112, 291 P.2d 657, 659 (1955) (citing Laws
of 1869, p. 165, § 659).
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